According to @grok, RSA is highly vulnerable to quantum attacks via Shor's algorithm, while SHA-256 used in Bitcoin hashing only faces Grover's quadratic speedup, which is not a near-term threat to Bitcoin’s proof-of-work security, source: @grok. Bitcoin’s ECDSA signatures are susceptible in principle to sufficiently large-scale quantum computers using Shor’s algorithm, highlighting the need for post-quantum migration paths, source: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography project; source: @grok. For trading, this implies limited near-term BTC security risk at the hashing level but a longer-horizon signature risk that market infrastructure must plan for, aligning with the assessment that Grover’s speedup is not imminent as a break, source: @grok; source: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography project.

According to @caprioleio, Bitcoin must confront the quantum computing threat now to secure its next decade, a point he discussed on The Investors Podcast video at youtube.com/watch?v=dFknx-mRmKE, source: Charles Edwards on X (Nov 16, 2025); The Investors Podcast on YouTube. For trading context, Bitcoin’s current digital signatures (ECDSA and Schnorr over secp256k1) are theoretically vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm once sufficiently capable fault-tolerant quantum computers exist, making a migration path to post-quantum schemes a material security consideration, source: BIP340 Schnorr signatures; Bitcoin Core documentation; P. W. Shor, SIAM Journal on Computing. Standards progress is underway, with NIST finalizing initial post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 (FIPS 203–206), providing concrete algorithm baselines that wallets and custodians can evaluate, source: NIST PQC standardization announcements (2024), FIPS 203–206. Actionable for traders, monitor three catalysts: new Bitcoin Improvement Proposals introducing post-quantum signatures, wallet software updates referencing NIST-approved PQC, and exchange or custodian security disclosures on PQ readiness, as highlighted by @caprioleio’s call for preparedness, source: Bitcoin BIPs repository; NIST PQC FIPS 203–206; major exchange security pages (e.g., Coinbase Security).

According to the source, talk of an upcoming IBM quantum computing milestone has revived questions about a potential Bitcoin Q-Day, but current public data indicates today’s machines remain far from breaking BTC’s ECDSA signatures (source: publicly available social media post; IBM Research 2023 quantum roadmap). IBM disclosed a 1,121‑qubit Condor processor and utility-scale, error-mitigated results on a 127‑qubit Eagle device in 2023, which are non–fault-tolerant and insufficient for large-scale Shor attacks on ECDSA-secp256k1 (source: IBM Research; Nature 2023 evidence-of-utility paper). Breaking Bitcoin’s ECDSA would require thousands of logical qubits and extremely deep circuits, implying millions of physical qubits at current error rates—well beyond near-term hardware (source: Roetteler et al. 2017 quantum resource estimates; NIST post-quantum cryptography guidance). Bitcoin uses ECDSA over secp256k1 and is vulnerable in principle to Shor’s algorithm once large fault‑tolerant machines exist, while Schnorr (BIP-340) is similarly based on the discrete log problem (source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide; Shor 1994). For trading, the near-term quantum risk premium to BTC appears low, but headline-driven volatility is possible; monitor IBM Research announcements, NIST/NSA PQC transition timelines starting mid‑2020s, and any Bitcoin Core discussions/BIPs on post‑quantum migration to gauge regime‑shift risk (source: IBM Research updates; NSA CNSA 2.0 memo; NIST PQC transition updates).

According to Charles Edwards (@caprioleio), up to 20–30% of BTC held in legacy P2PK outputs could be taken by a future quantum computer within 2–8 years, and he proposes either allowing theft-related dumping or enforcing a migration window that burns unmigrated coins (source: Charles Edwards on X, Oct 15, 2025). According to Bitcoin Wiki, P2PK outputs reveal public keys on-chain, leaving any unspent P2PK UTXOs inherently exposed if Shor’s algorithm breaks secp256k1 ECDSA (source: Bitcoin Wiki, Pay-to-Pubkey). According to NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography program, no cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists today, though ECDSA is not quantum-safe and migration to standardized PQC schemes like CRYSTALS-Dilithium will be required once timelines warrant (source: NIST PQC status reports, 2022–2024). According to Roetteler et al. (Microsoft Research), breaking a single secp256k1 key demands very large fault-tolerant quantum resources beyond current hardware, making the specific 2–8 year horizon uncertain for traders to price (source: Roetteler et al., 2017, Quantum Resource Estimates for ECC).

According to @caprioleio, Bitcoin must be upgraded to be quantum-proof by 2026, with a warning of severe consequences if no upgrade occurs. Source: https://twitter.com/caprioleio/status/1972473521730462153 The post sets a concrete 2026 timeline for quantum risk management around BTC’s signature schemes, signaling a near-term governance and security focus for market participants. Source: https://twitter.com/caprioleio/status/1972473521730462153 Bitcoin’s current signatures use ECDSA and Schnorr (BIP340) over secp256k1, both based on the discrete logarithm problem that Shor’s algorithm would break on a sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer, underscoring why post-quantum migration is being standardized globally. Source: https://developer.bitcoin.org/devglossary.html#term-ecdsa https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography

According to Google DeepMind, AlphaTensor-Quantum has outperformed existing methods in key arithmetic benchmarks, particularly for complex circuits used in Shor's algorithm and quantum chemistry simulations, automatically identifying optimal human-designed solutions. This advancement could impact trading strategies in quantum computing sectors by enhancing algorithmic efficiency and performance metrics.